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ABSTRACT 
 
This Master’s thesis examines the profitability of four different momentum investment 
strategies with formation periods of 3–12 months and each predicting the returns 2 months 
ahead during the years from 2006 to 2015 in an international stock market setting. Stocks 
of 11 different indices (CAC 40, DAX, FTSE 100 Index, MICEX, Nikkei 225, OMX 
Helsinki 25, OMX Stockholm 30, ASX 100, TSX 60, S&P 100 and EUROSTOXX 50) 
which represent four different continents are used in order to determine whether or not 
momentum gains exist. This thesis adopts the view of an American investor who is 
investing in a global pool of stocks. In total 705 stocks are used in the analysis and three 
different portfolios are formed from these stocks. Out of these portfolios the winner 
portfolio is bought and the loser portfolio is sold. This analysis is repeated four times for 
different datasets. Two datasets include stocks and two datasets include the used indices 
as a whole. The represented countries are also analyzed individually in order to point out 
the differences between countries. 
 
The results of the analysis for the whole time period indicate that the momentum returns 
are still present and persistent even though the stock market anomaly i.e. the used 
investment strategy has been found decades earlier. The momentum returns are also 
statistically significant in many of the used strategies. The results for the crisis period 
suggest that the momentum strategy is either not profitable or not statistically significant 
during a time period with a financial crisis. The results for the time period after the crisis 
however suggest that the momentum has been again profitable but the magnitude of the 
returns is smaller than during the whole time period. The results for the countries alone, 
however, point out that many of the countries do not have statistically significant 
momentum returns when the country is analyzed alone. Only U.S. and Great Britain have 
significant returns for all of the strategies. 
 
Even though these results are not statistically significant in all aspects, they still provide 
evidence for a well-researched finance topic and point out the importance of momentum 
in an academic and current setting.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
How to beat the market? That has been the motivation for many researchers, stockbrokers, 
portfolio managers etc. and many different investment strategies have been developed 
and tested in order to gain larger profits than the market and a typical buy-and-hold -
strategy normally has to offer. Efficient market hypothesis explains that stock prices 
include all information and therefore it is not possible to invent an investment strategy 
that is based on previous stock prices and that would generate abnormal positive returns 
(Fama 1970). Therefore, the best investment strategy would be the buy-and-hold the 
market portfolio which will generate returns that are obviously equal to the market return 
of the same time period (Shleifer 2000).  
 
Some investors have reached returns that are greater than the market return using different 
investment strategies, and researchers have found evidence that using past information as 
an investment strategy can help to generate abnormal returns. Many investment strategies 
have been developed and Levy’s research (1967) is considered to be the first one to 
examine something very similar to momentum investment strategy. His investment 
strategy uses stocks that are priced above their 27 week average price. (Levy 1967.) His 
results have been questioned and somewhat proven false by Jensen and Bennington 
(1970) but later researchers have been studying past prices and concluded that momentum 
investment strategy i.e. buying past winners and selling past losers, is profitable.  
 
Momentum investment strategy is only one among many investment strategies and later 
on even an opposite strategy – contrarian i.e. buying past losers and selling past winners 
– has been developed or rather discovered. Not only has new investment strategies been 
discovered but also stock market anomalies have been discovered. These anomalies show 
that it is possible to gain abnormal returns on stock markets simply investing on certain 
time periods of the year or on certain kind of stocks. Momentum is also considered as a 
stock market anomaly. Momentum has been widely acknowledged and studied but recent 
literature still emerges and different viewpoints have been developed.  
 
 
1.1. The purpose or the thesis 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to expand the international view to this well researched 
investment strategy while also using the viewpoint of an American investor which is 
managed by confirming all the prices to USD. This thesis will aim to figure out whether 
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or not the momentum investment strategy is usable for a regular investor by testing a set 
of momentum strategies in a diverse stock environment. In addition to the viewpoint of 
an American investor the global data will also be examined individually i.e. all countries 
will be examined individually in order to find out if momentum profits differ between 
countries. While the main analysis of this thesis concentrates on the momentum profits 
of the stock portfolios, this thesis also uses a new viewpoint in which indices are used 
instead of stocks as an investment subject. The earliest studies on momentum concentrate 
on using only the U.S. data and most of them use also nearly or exactly the same time 
period. This results in similar research conclusions and accusations of data mining. More 
recent studies have concentrated on using either global data outside of the U.S. or global 
data including also the U.S. data. Motivated by the earlier research but inspired by the 
recent research this thesis will aim to contribute to all the studies made in this field by 
expanding the international evidence as well as making comparisons between countries 
and different indices.  
 
 
1.2. Limitations and assumptions 
 
The main limitation for the master’s thesis is the small size of the data compared with 
other similar studies. The maximum amount of firms in a sample with multiple European 
indices (with EUROSTOXX 50) is 760 (585) out of which 655 (506) stocks qualify to be 
used in the thesis. Compared to other studies in this field, this sample is small. The data 
is, however, still comprehensive because it includes stocks from four different continents 
and 10 different countries and also the additional European countries that are present in 
the second sample which includes the EUROSTOXX 50. Many of the main western or 
westernized countries are included which also means that many of the indices that are 
considered to be the most important ones in the global stock markets are included in the 
data set. However, including only western or westernized countries means obviously that 
the next limitation of the thesis stems from the fact that some important stock markets, 
indices and stocks might be left out because they belong to the countries that are outside 
the so called westernized world. The data is limited to the westernized countries because 
of the easier availability of data in these countries’ stock markets and also because of the 
fact that westernized countries’ indices possibly have more stocks in them that have 
observations for the whole time period. The length of the time period is also rather short 
compared to many of the previous momentum studies. The time period is limited to ten 
years in order to collect as many observations as possible because only stocks that have 
observations for the whole time period are included in the study. 
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Previous studies have proven that there are abnormal returns that could be gained if 
momentum is used as an investment strategy. Because of the academic nature of the 
previous studies, it is difficult to say if this investment strategy would actually work in a 
practical, real-life situation. Additional factors (which control for e.g. the risk factor or 
data mining) should be included in order to clarify the practical point-of-view. For 
example, degree of turnover and trading costs can have a significant impact on the gained 
returns in a practical market place investment situation. (Nørregård 2008: 5.) Additional 
factors have been used in many of the more recent studies to determine whether 
momentum gains are the result of some sort of other anomaly or if they are purely due to 
the momentum strategy’s significance. This thesis will not use any of the additional 
factors. This thesis will concentrate on the pure momentum strategy which could be 
considered as a limitation when comparing this thesis with those studies that have used 
additional factors in their research.  
 
The main assumption of the thesis is that momentum strategy does exist and that this 
research should provide more evidence for the strategy. This is based on the vast amount 
of previous studies that have proven the momentum strategy to be profitable. However, 
this thesis does accept the fact that opposing conclusions have also been made and some 
of the previous studies conclude that not all countries behave similarly in this respect. 
There has been evidence that momentum strategy is not profitable in some of the countries 
included in this thesis. This has to be taken into consideration. Therefore it is obvious that 
if this research does not support the momentum strategy or at least some of the countries 
results do not support the momentum strategy, it has to be acknowledged and for the sake 
of academic research it has to be made public in the thesis even though the main 
assumption of the thesis is that momentum strategy does exist and that it does generate 
abnormal returns. 
 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized in six parts that will give different views to 
understanding momentum strategy and the meaning of the thesis. The second part of the 
thesis concentrates on theoretical background, adding momentum to a pool of finance 
related theories. The third part includes a literature review with views to previous studies 
on momentum, contradicting results and criticism. Fourth part will define the research 
questions for the empirical study. Fifth part consists of data and methodology. This part 
introduces descriptive data and defines the formation and holding periods as well as 
10 
 
describes the data by means of describing the chosen indices and the characteristics of the 
chosen time period. The sixth part of the thesis introduces the empirical results from the 
analytical research of the momentum strategy and the indices. Finally, the last part 
consists of conclusions based on the entire thesis. It will also give answers to the posed 
research questions.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Fama (1970) introduces the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) which basically states 
that it is impossible to gain excess returns because if the markets are efficient, no 
additional, public or private, information results to a profitable investment strategy 
because the market prices already contain all possible and relevant information. Only new 
information can cause the stock prices to react and the reaction will be immediate and 
correct. Therefore information asymmetry or delayed price reactions do not exist and 
cannot be utilized in seek for gaining abnormal returns. The losses and gains experienced 
in the stock markets are therefore due to luck and chance. The EMH suggests a division 
of the markets into three different categories each representing the level of efficiency i.e. 
the extents to which all possible information is reflected to the market. (Bodie, Kane & 
Marcus 2014; Fama 1970.) 
 
The weak form of market efficiency means that the market prices contain all the available 
past information e.g. the past stock prices and trading volume. The market has been 
widely tested for the weak form of market efficiency and the evidence suggests that the 
stock market actually is in its weak form of market efficiency. (Fama 1970). The weak 
form makes the technical analysis, which uses the historical prices, useless. Therefore it 
is obvious that those in favor of technical analysis or momentum which also uses past 
price information do not concur with this conclusion. (Ruotsalainen 2016.)  
 
The semi-strong efficient market includes all the historical information and also all the 
publicly available information about the firm and the stock. These include e.g. the 
financial statements and patents. (Fama 1970; Bodie et al. 2014.) All this publicly 
available information is reflected to the stock prices (Ruotsalainen 2016). The strong form 
of market efficiency includes all the private and insider information and all the publically 
available information (Fama 1970). Combined to the immediate and correct reaction to 
new information this means that the prices should be able to react to the new insider 
information immediately and with a correct magnitude in order for the markets to be in 
the strong form of market efficiency (Bodie et al. 2014). Even Fama (1970 & 1991) 
concludes that the strong form of market efficiency is most likely false and it rather should 
be used as a benchmark in later research. Due to linkages of EMH with transaction costs 
and positive information the strong form of market efficiency cannot hold true but can 
still be used as a benchmark (Fama 1991). 
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Fama (1991) states that one of the biggest problems for the EMH are the joint-hypotheses 
which stem from the fact that the EMH in itself cannot be tested alone. Therefore EMH 
is tested by using asset-pricing models. If the chosen asset-pricing model succeeds in 
explaining the prices then the markets are efficient. This is obviously problematic because 
it announces the importance of finding the perfect asset-pricing model that will explain 
the returns no matter where the returns originate from. For example momentum returns 
have not been successfully explained by any asset-pricing model. (Fama 1991; 
Ruotsalainen 2016.) Joint-hypotheses are not the only method that have been used in 
market efficiency studies. Event studies aim for recognizing the exact moment and the 
speed and the correctness of the price reaction to a certain new information. (Fama 1991.)  
 
The existence of stock market anomalies i.e. returns that cannot be explained by any asset-
pricing model (e.g. momentum returns), can either be taken as evidence for inaccurate 
asset-pricing models or inefficient stock markets which again highlights the problem of 
joint-hypotheses (Schwert 2002; Ruotsalainen 2016). Schwert (2002) points out that the 
stock market anomalies have a tendency to disappear or weaken gradually over time after 
they have been discovered. This might suggest that the anomalies are only historically 
profitable or that the anomalies are taken advantage of so that they are eventually 
arbitraged away. This tendency to disappear or weaken questions the usage of anomalies 
as an evidence against market efficiency. However, it seems that the momentum returns 
have persisted over time, decades after they have been discovered. A very popular notion 
is that the momentum returns are due to a yet unidentified risk factor. (Schwert 2002.) 
 
 
2.2. Asset-pricing models 
 
All of the six asset-pricing models presented in this chapter offer different viewpoints to 
the theory of how stock prices are in theory formed. The momentum investment strategy 
bases its sell/buy decisions on historical prices and therefore, in order to understand the 
prices and momentum, the theoretical asset-pricing models are an important addition to 
the theoretical background. Stock prices are affected by a vast amount of factors which 
most likely have not all to this date been identified. These asset-pricing models all try to 
explain the asset prices by using different factors in their models. (Ruotsalainen 2016.)  
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2.2.1. Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
 
The dividend discount model (DDM) – as its name suggests – considers the stock’s price 
as a result of the future dividends from current time to perpetuity. Dividends are 
discounted to represent the current value of the stock. Its reasoning stems from the 
viewpoint that the capital gains are already included in the dividends already when the 
stock is sold i.e. the price of the stock is purely based on the future cash flow incoming 
for the investor. (Bodie et al. 2014). 
 
 
(1.)   V0=
D1
1+k
+
D2
(1+k)2
+…+
Dt
(1+k)t
 
 
Where, V0 is the current value of the stock, D is the dividend at time t, and k is the return 
on equity (Bodie et al. 2014). 
 
The DDM suggests that the returns of momentum strategy or any other anomaly could be 
traced back to the firm's past dividends. Because these announcements are public 
information, momentum would be arbitraged away. Momentum returns are not, however, 
tied to firms with high dividend yields and therefore the DDM simply cannot explain the 
momentum returns. (Ruotsalainen 2016.) 
 
2.2.2. Free Cash Flow Model (FCF) 
 
The free cash flow model (FCF) uses a similar viewpoint with the previous DDM. 
Whereas DDM only considers the future dividends as a source of cash flow, the FCF 
considers the cash flow as everything that is available to stock holders on top of the capital 
they have invested (Bodie et al. 2014). This is obviously a usable model while analyzing 
firms that do not issue dividends. The original model can be further improved by replacing 
the return on equity with the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), out of which the 
firm’s debt can be reduced so that the value of equity can be found. The formula leads to 
the current value of the firm and needs to be divided by the amount of outstanding shares. 
(Puttonen & Knüpfer 2009; Bodie et al. 2014.) 
 
 
(2.) 𝑃0 = ∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1  
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Where P0 is the current value of the firm, t is the time period, FCF is the free cash flow, 
and WACC is the weighted average cost of capital (Puttonen & Knüpfer 2009). 
 
2.2.3. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
 
CAPM has been developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) at approximately the 
same time although they worked individually. They aimed at finding a way to predict the 
future behavior of capital markets and creating a theory that would explain how 
conditions of risk affect the outcome in markets. CAPM describes the relationship 
between the asset’s price and its risk. The model simplifies the markets and states that the 
expected returns of an asset increase linearly with its beta. The result is a security market 
line on which the assets are on average assumed to be located. (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 
1965; Brealey et al. 2011: 220–224.) The theory developed by Lintner and Sharpe has 
ever since been considered as one of the most important theories in the field of finance 
and it has been used continuously on a large scale even though it has been widely proven 
that the CAPM is not the ultimate truth. It is one of the most used models in the field of 
financial research. CAPM is calculated by finding out the risk premium of a certain stock 
which is then added with the risk free interest rate. The risk premium is calculated by 
multiplying the stock's beta with the risk premium of the market. (Puttonen & Knüpfer 
2009.) 
 
 
(3.) 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] 
 
Where E(ri) is the expected return for stock i, rf is the riske free interest rate, Bi is the beta 
of stock i, and E(rm) is the expected return of the market (Puttonen & Knüpfer 2009). 
 
2.2.4. Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
 
Arbitrage pricing theory (APT), developed by Ross (1976), has a somewhat similar but 
still completely different viewpoint to the problem of how to predict the future returns of 
an asset if compared to its "kindered spirit" CAPM. While CAPM uses beta as a tool to 
predict future returns, the APT uses the asset’s sensitivity to a small set of pervasive 
factors that might be different for different firms. Sensitivity to the microeconomic factors 
is the main attribute in terms of asset’s price but its price is also affected by unique set of 
firm-specific factors. (Ross 1976; Brealey et al. 2011: 228–229.) 
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(4.)  𝐸(𝑟𝑗) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝑏𝑗1𝑅𝑃1 + 𝑏𝑗2𝑅𝑃2 +⋯+ 𝑏𝑗𝑛𝑅𝑃𝑛 
 
Where E(rj) is the expected return of an asset, rf is the risk free rate, bj is the sensitivity of 
the asset to the factor and RP is the risk premium of the factor (Ross 1976). 
 
2.2.5. Three-factor model 
 
Three-factor model, developed by Fama and French (1993), is one form of the APT. Fama 
and French (1993) have found factors that may help to predict the future expected returns. 
(Fama & French 1993.) Small firms and high book-to-market firms have shown that they 
can provide above average returns which cannot be explained with the CAPM (Bodie et 
al. 2014). Three-factor model states that all returns on top of the risk free return are 
explained by the sensitivity to the three factors used in the formula. These factors are 
market (i.e. the excess returns which are calculated by subtracting the risk free interest 
rate from the market returns), size (i.e. the returns of small stocks minus the returns of 
large stocks; SmallMinusBig) and book-to-market (i.e. the returns of high book-to-market 
firms minus the returns of low book-to-market firms; HighMinusLow). (Fama & French 
1995; Brealey et al. 2011: 229–230.)  
 
 
(5.) 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Where Ri is the return of the stock/portfolio i, Rf is the risk free rate, ai is the intercept, 
bi(rm-rf) is the factor beta for market returns multiplied by market index returns, siSMB is 
the factor beta for small minus big multiplied by the returns of the small minus big, 
hiHML is the factor beta for high minus low multiplied by the returns of high minus low, 
ei is the influence of other factors affecting the stock's/portfolio's price (Fama & French 
1996). 
 
The model performs better than the CAPM in predicting the returns of small stocks and 
other anomalous returns but not those of the momentum strategy (Fama & French 1993; 
1996). To be perfect i.e. if the factors in the model were the only risk factors affecting the 
price of an asset, the intercept of the model should always be zero (Bodie et al. 2014). For 
momentum strategy the intercepts have been positive and to a greater extent than the 
intercepts from the CAPM. This is somewhat confusing because the three-factor model 
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is considered to be more robust than the CAPM. (Ruotsalainen 2016.) Later the model 
has been criticized as being incomplete and not being able to depict much of the variation 
that actually occurs due to profitability and investments (Titman, Wei & Xie 2004; Novy-
Marx 2013). This is why Fama and French’s five-factor model was introduced (Fama & 
French 2015: 5). 
 
2.2.6. Five-factor model 
 
The five-factor model expands the previous three-factor model by adding two more 
variables: profitability (i.e. the returns of portfolios with robust profitability minus the 
returns of portfolios with weak profitability; RobustMinusWeak – which was suggested 
by Novy-Marx (2013)) and investment patterns (i.e. the returns of conservatively invested 
portfolios minus the returns of aggressively invested portfolios; 
ConservativeMinusAggressive). Five-factor model has also been used to explain the 
anomalous returns and the results have been compared with the three-factor model in 
order to find out whether or not it was able to do that. The five-factor model produces 
intercepts that are closer to zero than the intercepts of the three-factor model which 
suggests that the five-factor model performs better in explaining the returns of the stocks. 
It is estimated to explain 71–94 % of the cross-variance in expected returns. However, 
Fama and French concluded that a four-factor model (i.e. the five-factor model without 
HML) performs nearly as well as the five-factor model which would suggest that the 
HML factor is not that important in explaining asset prices. Again, this model is not able 
to explain the returns of momentum strategy. (Fama & French 2015.)  
 
 
(6.)  𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Where Ri is the return of the stock/portfolio i, Rf is the risk free rate, ai is the intercept, 
bi(rm-rf) is the factor beta for market returns multiplied by market index returns, siSMB is 
the factor beta for small minus big multiplied by the returns of the small minus big, 
hiHML is the factor beta for high minus low multiplied by the returns of high minus low, 
riRMW is the factor beta for robust minus weak multiplied by returns of robust minus 
weak, ciCMA is the factor beta for conservative minus aggressive multiplied by the 
returns of conservative minus aggressive, ei is the influence of other factors affecting the 
stock's/portfolio's price (Fama & French 2015). 
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2.3. Stock market anomalies 
 
As stated earlier in this thesis: it has been documented that the EMH does not hold and 
that excess returns do occur. Researchers have proven, that excess returns occur 
especially in certain ways that can be implemented as an investment strategy. Stock 
market anomalies have been identified in huge numbers and their amount only keeps 
getting bigger. In this context only few of the vast amount of stock market anomalies are 
explained briefly. Needless to say, that momentum is an anomaly as well and will be 
explained in length later. In this chapter some seasonal anomalies will be considered. It 
is important to notice that these anomalies have been studied quite heavily but in this 
context only one (or possibly few) of all the studies are mentioned. Needless to say 
secondly, is that the field of anomalies includes much more anomalies in all possible 
shapes, colors and forms (so to say).  
 
2.3.1. January effect 
 
January effect is probably one of the best known seasonal stock market anomalies. 
Researchers have shown that returns tend to be higher during January but also that this 
anomaly is closely related to firm size and book-to-market (e.g. Banz 1981; Houge & 
Loughran 2005). Since gaining all of its interest the debate of January effect's existence 
or disappearance has been on-going. The debate has concentrated on either still existing 
or not existing or existing in some parts of the world (mainly in less developed countries). 
Patel (2016) concludes that January effect has lost its persistence and does not exist 
anymore. Signs of January effect are not found neither from high nor low volatility 
periods and neither bearish nor bullish markets. The main conclusion is that January effect 
does not exist. (Patel 2016.) Simbolon (2015) and Georgiou (2015) study Indonesian and 
European stock markets. Both of them come to the same conclusion as Patel, and 
conclude that the January effect does not exist in these markets. (Simbolon 2015 & 
Georgiou 2015.) This is evidence of an anomaly that has slowly disappeared after its 
discovery. 
 
2.3.2. Halloween effect 
 
Jacobsen, Mamun and Visaltanachoti (2005) report that unlike the January effect, the 
Halloween effect – which means that returns tend to be higher right after Halloween i.e. 
in November – is unrelated to the size and book-to-market factors (Jacobsen et al. 2005). 
Carrazedo, Curto and Oliveira (2016) report significant Halloween effect returns on 
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European markets. They state that a Halloween effect based trading strategy would 
outperform the buy and hold strategy 8 times out of 10 and that it would generate 
approximately 2.4 % of excess returns. (Carrazedo et al. 2016.) Loon, Mei, San, Yong & 
Min (2015) study the existence of Halloween effect in Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, 
China and Indonesia in order to find out if this effect is present in Asian markets as it is 
normally considered a European effect. During their time period from 2000 to 2014 they 
find persistent evidence that the Halloween effect is also part of the Asian stock markets. 
(Loon et al. 2015.) 
 
2.3.3. Other seasonal anomalies 
 
Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) report significantly lower returns during summer months 
than what can be expected during winter months. Their study of 37 countries shows that 
returns are below or close to zero for many of the countries from May to October and 
significantly higher from November to April. This leads to a “Sell in May” anomaly or 
investment strategy. (Bouman & Jacobsen 2002.) Rossi, Della Peruta and Mihai Yiannaki 
(2016) study four European countries in order to find out whether or not some of the 
newer seasonal anomalies exists in European markets. Day of the week and day of the 
month effects provide abnormal returns in European markets as well as in previously well 
studied U.S. markets. The results are not that convincing though and they conclude that 
strong across-the-board evidence is not found and that the strongest and the most 
favorable results are only country-specific. This could lead to a conclusion that the 
seasonal anomalies are at best country-specific and therefore different countries might 
have different anomalies present in their markets. (Rossi et al. 2016.)  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Previous studies on momentum 
 
As stated in the introduction, Levy (1967) is one of the first researchers to examine, what 
he calls relative strength trading rule. His intention is to prove, that the dominant idea of 
stock prices being independent and not related to any statistically observable pattern, does 
not hold. He wants to prove that there are patterns which can predict the future returns of 
stocks. His approach to the matter is to study the co-movement of stock prices with the 
different methods of technical analysis. This method filters out the co-movement of 
stocks by using ranking of the stocks which measures the relative strength of the stocks. 
His study concludes that buying stocks, that are priced significantly higher than what their 
average prices have been over the past 27 weeks, generates significant abnormal returns. 
Basically this method is the same as in the strategy that is nowadays called the momentum 
strategy. Levy also states that the results of his study do not totally reject the random walk 
hypothesis (even though the results obviously point that way). (Levy 1967: 595–596, 
609.) Levy’s study has later been criticized and the critique is covered later in this thesis 
(Chapter 3.3.). 
 
Later, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) state that some evidence for the momentum strategy 
can actually be found from the success of mutual funds, out of which many still use the 
momentum strategy. They examine momentum and come to the conclusion that the 
momentum portfolios performance persists over medium-term horizon. A portfolio that 
is based on buying past winners and selling past losers generates statistically significant 
positive returns over the following three to twelve months holding period. However it 
seems that after twelve months the positive returns vanish and the strategy is not 
profitable during the two years following the holding period. They report momentum 
returns that are statistically significant in all of their portfolios which use formation and 
holding periods of 3–12 months. The returns in their study vary from 0.0149 % (12-3 
lagged strategy) to 0.0058 % (3-6 strategy) suggesting that during the years of 1965–1989 
the average momentum portfolio returns are quite small but still statistically significant. 
(Jegadeesh & Titman 1993.) 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) study also proves that the success of momentum strategies 
is not due to the systematic risk or lead-lag effects that are due to delayed reactions of the 
stock prices to the common factors. However their results do indicate that delayed price 
reactions to the firm-specific information have something to do with the abnormal returns 
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that momentum strategy generates. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) state that in their 
opinion overreaction (return reversals) and under reaction (return persistence) are most 
likely too simplistic reasons for momentum gains. They call for a more sophisticated 
model to explain the pattern of returns. One explanation given in their research is that the 
act of buying past winners and selling past losers is what makes the prices shift from their 
long-term average and therefore it causes the prices to overreact. Another possible 
explanation for over- and under reaction is that the markets overreact to the long-term 
prospects of firms and on the other hand markets underreact to the short-term prospects 
of firms. (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993: 66–69, 89–90.)  
 
Again Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) examine momentum and demonstrate that the 
momentum profits still exist nearly a decade later. They document that the momentum 
returns are of the same magnitude during the 8 years following their first study. Their 
previous results have been widely accepted but on the other hand some have said that the 
momentum profits are either compensation for risk or product of data mining. Because of 
these allegations, they examine momentum profits for the second time. Jegadeesh and 
Titman discover that the previous results are still reality and the magnitude has stayed on 
the same level, thus supporting the fact that the earlier results are not due to data mining. 
Therefore, momentum strategy still generates about one percent per month for the 
following year after the formation period. Their second motivation for this second study 
was to find possible reasons why the momentum strategies are profitable and also to 
evaluate these reasons. Their research supports the behavioral explanation of delayed 
overreactions that are finally reversed but the research also states that this supportive 
evidence should be dealt with caution and is at best only a partial explanation for the 
momentum strategy. (Jegadeesh and Titman 2001: 699–701, 718–719.) 
 
Novy-Marx (2012) concludes that past performance information which is collected using 
intermediate time horizon generates better returns than when using recent time horizon. 
He reports returns of 1.21 % to the 12-7 strategy and 0.77 % to the 6-2 strategy. Similar 
results can also be found for other asset classes besides stocks. He also concludes that 
momentum is not really driven by the trend of falling stock prices to keep falling or rising 
prices to keep rising, but it is the result of the firms’ performance seven to twelve months 
before the formation of the portfolio. The information which is used when forming the 
portfolios should be gathered several months before the actual formation period. 
Therefore, in his opinion the term momentum does not accurately describe what the 
strategy is really about. This is due to the theoretical definition of the term momentum 
which states that momentum is “the tendency of an object in motion to stay in motion” 
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(Novy-Marx 2012). His result that the intermediate time horizon is better than the recent 
time horizon does not support the traditional view of momentum – that is the short run 
autocorrelation of the stock prices. Novy-Marx states that his results cannot be explained 
by any known results – the behavioral and the rational explanations do not explain the 
results. Finally, he also states that the large cap firms have not been given enough 
attention and that the momentum is stronger in the large cap firms that has previously 
been acknowledged. (Novy-Marx 2012.) 
 
Rouwenhorst (1998: 283) examines 12 European countries during 1980–1995. His 
motivation for the research and for the European data stems from the previous criticism 
that the conclusions and evidence for momentum phenomenon are the result of data 
snooping. Previous studies use mainly, basically the same U.S. data. Rouwenhorst 
examines firms from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Rouwenhorst constructs his portfolios using the same method with Jegadeesh and 
Titman’s study in 1993. He documents returns that vary from 0.0077 % (3-3 strategy) to 
0.0135 % (12-3 strategy) per month for a data with all the countries in his data. The results 
state that the medium-term winner-portfolio outperforms the medium-term loser-
portfolio by about one percent per month. These results prove that momentum strategy 
generates abnormal returns in Europe whereas earlier studies prove this phenomenon in 
the U.S. The results also prove that the data snooping claim is not valid. (Rouwenhorst 
1998: 267–269, 283.)  
 
Nørregård (2008) continues with a European data and studies momentum in the Danish 
stock market and finds evidence that the momentum is also apparent in the Danish stock 
market environment. The returns of momentum strategies in Danish stock markets vary 
from 0.014 % (3-3 strategy without lag) to 0.192 % (12-3 strategy with and without a 
lag). He also concludes that the price momentum should not anymore be called a market 
anomaly but it should be called a dominating market factor because of the extensive 
research results that have shown its existence. Nørregård does stress that the results are 
academic in nature and therefore there is no proof that the strategy will actually work in 
a real-life investing scene. He compares his results with one of the most popular studies 
in this field. He concludes that his results are similar to the ones which are discovered by 
Jegadeesh and Titman in 1993. (Nørregård 2008: 1–2, 4–5, 57.) 
 
MSCI BARRA –research center (2010) has published a study of the momentum strategy 
in the Asian stock markets. The overall view of the Asian stock markets and the 
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momentum strategy during the years of 1995–2009 is similar to the other studies in this 
field. The momentum strategy is profitable in Asia but there are huge local differences 
among the different regions. Some of the countries, for example Australia (together with 
New Zealand 3.3 %) and India (together with Pakistan 4.2 %) have larger momentum 
gains than the data set as a whole. On the other hand, for example the Philippines and 
Thailand (with Indonesia and Malaysia) have negative momentum gains of -2.7 % during 
the time period. This is due to the market crash of Asia which hit these countries the 
worst. The research of the MSCI BARRA has interesting results concerning the Japanese 
stock market. The results show that the momentum strategy is profitable only during the 
years of 1996–1999 due to the rise technology industry. After this time period the 
momentum strategy has not beaten the market in Japan. For the whole time period the 
average momentum gains in the Japanese stock markets are -2.2 % per year. The 
following figure presents the level of returns in MSCI BARRA's research. (MSCI 
BARRA 2010.)  
 
For this thesis the interesting results of the MSCI BARRA (2010) concern Australia and 
Japan. These two countries and their indices are included in this research and because the 
time period of the thesis and the MSCI BARRA study are partly overlapping, similar 
results might be expected. This means that the Australian stocks should generate positive 
returns and possibly even larger momentum gains than some of the other countries. On 
the other hand the results concerning the Japanese index can be expected to be worse than 
the other countries’ returns. It might even mean that the Japanese stocks have not 
outperformed the market during the time period used in this thesis. 
 
Hancock (2010) uses a data spanning from 1927 to 2009. He concludes that the strategy 
generates returns approximately 3 % per year more than the stock market. But he also 
concludes that the beginning of the 21st century has been the weakest for the momentum 
strategy and during the first years of the century it has only barely beaten the market. 
Hancock names two explaining reasons for the weak performance of the strategy. First, 
he concluded that the momentum strategy is not at its best if used when the stock market 
is either at the bottom or at the top. Six months after hitting the bottom/top the strategy 
does not anymore beat the market. Second, the volatility of the stock market does not 
favor the momentum strategy because it is not related to the “trendiness” of the market or 
the stocks which is something that the momentum strategy is closely related to. Volatility 
on the other hand is related to the mean revision – in other words, volatility is related to 
how the prices return to their mean values. Obviously volatility is not good for momentum 
because the users of momentum strategy do not want the prices to return to their mean 
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values but they want them to keep rising. As a conclusion, Hancock’s research states that 
the momentum strategy generates abnormal positive returns – i.e. it works – when the 
stock market is in its so called normal state but it does not work when the stock market is 
volatile or when it is at its bottom or at its top position. (Hancock 2010.) 
 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2014) study the recent recessions and conclude that using the 
momentum strategy comes with a risk of statistically high negative returns after major 
market crashes. Daniel and Moskowitz (2014) report that the worst returns of the 
momentum portfolio in 21st century have occurred in 01/2001, 10–11/2001, 11/2002, 03–
04/2009 and 08/2009. These worst momentum returns range from -24.98 % (in 10/2001) 
to -49.19 % (in 01/2001). They call this phenomenon a momentum crash and state that 
these crashes are driven by the loser portfolios because of the bear markets and the up- 
and down-beta differentials. In other words, this phenomenon is mainly due to the fact 
that when the conditions of the stock markets start to improve, the past losers begin to 
generate large positive returns. In the end this results in the so called momentum crash 
because the past losers are sold and not bought which would be the best thing to do in 
that situation. (Daniel & Moskowitz 2014.) 
 
Grobys’ (2014) study is one of the most recent ones and it is done using a global data 
which is partly the same as the one used in this thesis. He examines momentum during 
the recent economic downturns and concludes that this strategy generates significant 
negative returns during those specific times. His study also concludes that the momentum 
strategy was profitable during the years of 1993–2013 but as stated earlier it generates 
statistically significant negative returns during the recent recessions. Besides his study, 
there has been surprisingly few studies (apart from Daniel & Moskowitz 2014) about how 
momentum strategy would perform during economic downturns even though there has 
been many studies about momentum in the so called normal economic setting. His study 
includes indices from almost every continent, excluding Africa. Some of the indices are 
also included in this thesis (CAC 40, DAX, FTSE100, S&P/TSX Canada and Nikkei 
225). This thesis and Grobys’ study do differ in the used time period as well as in the used 
indices because both use many other indices as well. (Grobys 2014: 100–103.) 
 
Jannen and Pham (2009) compare three different momentum strategies in order to find 
out which one of them generates the largest returns when using the same data set. First of 
the strategies is the one that is used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Second strategy has 
previously been used by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). Their strategy uses an industry 
factor and is therefore called the industry momentum. The last strategy is a strategy that 
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has been used by George and Hwang (2004) which is based on using the highest price of 
the preceding 52 weeks as a comparison. The stocks are chosen to the portfolio if their 
current price is near the 52 week high. Jannen and Pham’s study concludes that during 
the years of 1999–2007 the most profitable of the three strategies is the industry 
momentum which generates returns of 1.357 % per month during the six month holding 
period. Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) strategy generates the second best returns of 0.888 
% per month and the 52 week high price comparison is the least profitable of the three 
strategies and generates returns of 0.174 % per month. (Jannen & Pham 2009.) 
 
The stock markets are not the only ones to show persistent momentum returns. Other asset 
classes also provide abnormal returns that occur when using a momentum strategy. 
Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) find in their wide study from 1972 to 2011 that 
momentum return premia occurs across eight different markets (the U.S., the U.K., 
continental Europe and Japan) but also across different asset classes – such as currencies, 
commodities and government bonds. Asness et al. (2013) document momentum gains 
from currencies are 3.0 % on average and momentum gains from commodities are on 
average 12.4 % while globally all asset classes generate on average 5.0 %. (Asness et al. 
2013.)  
 
Not only is momentum profitable when it is used alone but its profitability increases when 
it is used alongside with other investment strategies. Using momentum as a part of a larger 
investment strategy has inspired researchers. Asness, Ilmanen, Israel and Moskowitz 
(2015) conclude that combining different investment strategies that have low correlations 
with each other most likely leads to a successful investment portfolio. They combine 
momentum strategy with value, carry and defensive. Their study shows that momentum 
strategy along with the other three strategies on average “work everywhere”, i.e. the 
strategies work across different asset classes and different markets. Combining these four 
strategies proves to be more beneficial than only using one of the strategies or alternating 
between these strategies (but only using one at a time). Asset classes that are included in 
their research consist of for example currencies and commodity futures. (Asness et al. 
2015: 34–35, 56.)  
 
Another example of a combined strategy is in Fuertes, Miffre and Fernandez-Perez’ 
(2014) research. They introduce a – what they call – triple-screen strategy which 
combines momentum with term structure and idiosyncratic volatility. They analyze the 
excess returns that are generated in the commodity futures markets. They report that 
during the period of 1979–2011 triple-screen strategy generates annualized total returns 
25 
 
of 11.46 %. However, momentum alone during that same time period generates 11.42 % 
of annualized total returns whereas term structure and idiosyncratic volatility could only 
generate returns of 7.02 % and 3.76 % when they are used alone. The triple-screen 
strategy also has an average Sharpe ratio of 0.69 whereas the average Sharpe ratio of 
individual strategies is 0.37. (Fuertes et al. 2014: 1–2, 16, 22.)  
 
 
3.2. Explaining the momentum returns 
 
Even though the momentum investment strategy has been widely studied and accepted – 
at least in some of the finance research circles – the reasons behind the anomaly are not 
mutually accepted. The reasons behind momentum gains have been studied and some 
conclusions have been made but the conclusions and results have been contradicting and 
no consensus has been found on the true reason behind momentum gains. Some of the 
reasons in previous studies are for example stock-specific factors, industry related factors 
and broader macroeconomic factors. Also so called temporarily explanatory factors – 
factors that explain the existence of momentum gains on a temporary basis – have been 
found in previous studies. These factors include for example the risk factor which strongly 
supports the traditional finance literature. Traditional finance literature is based on the 
theories such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(introduced in Chapter 2.). It is suggested that an existence of an anomaly such as the 
momentum means that those traditional theories are not be valid anymore mainly because 
they do not manage to explain the existence of these anomalies. The classical theorists 
have argued that the momentum is only a temporary illusion that will not exist for long. 
On the other hand the supporters of the momentum strategy – and other stock market 
anomalies – insist that the traditional views should be all in all dismissed because of the 
fact that they do not provide an explanation for the question why these anomalies keep 
existing. (Nørregård 2008: 1–2.) 
 
As stated earlier, various factors have been examined in order to determine the true reason 
behind the momentum strategy’s success and why the stock markets seem to be acting 
irrationally. These factors and the reasons that have been found in previous studies to 
explain the momentum gains at least to some extent are now briefly examined. 
Explanation for momentum gains has been searched from the size of the company. Many 
studies have shown that the momentum gains are larger for smaller firms while larger 
firms generate lower momentum gains. (Fama & French 1993 & 2010; Kothari, Shanken 
& Sloan 1995.) Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) study indicates that the firm-specific 
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information might explain the momentum strategy’s success at least to some extent. Their 
other explanation for momentum is that the momentum itself causes the prices to move 
from their long-term average and therefore causes also the overreaction of the prices. The 
third explanation in their study is that the momentum gains are due to the markets 
overreacting/underreacting to long-term/short-term prospects of the firms. They also 
supported the behavioral explanation. (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993; 2001.) 
 
Ruotsalainen (2016) has summarized some of the possible explanations behind 
momentum strategy's success. These are shown in his table below (Table 1.). 
 
 
 Table 1. Reasons behind momentum (Ruotsalainen 2016.) 
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3.3. Contradicting results and criticism 
 
As mentioned, Levy is one of the first researchers to study the momentum strategy. 
However, his study does not satisfy all other researchers and because of that, it has been 
criticized. For example, Jensen and Benington (1970) study Levy’s rules and they come 
to the opposite conclusion. They state that Levy’s relative strength rules do not hold and 
that random walks or efficient market hypothesis cannot be abandoned. Jensen and 
Benington also stated that Levy studied nearly 70 different trading rules before he came 
up with the relative strength trading rule and they state that this is obviously problematic. 
They test Levy’s rule with a data that was for the most parts different to the data which 
Levy has used. Their result is that this relative strength trading strategy does not 
outperform a simple buy and hold strategy. Because they cannot certify Levy’s results, 
they conclude that Levy’s results must have been due to data mining. They state that 
Levy’s rule is useless with any other dataset than the one that is used by Levy himself and 
this means that the rule does not exist as a trading rule. (Jensen and Benington 1970.) 
 
Momentum, has been well examined and evidence has been found that it is able to 
generate abnormal results. The opposite strategy – contrarian strategy – has also been 
proven to generate abnormal returns. Whereas momentum is based on buying past 
winners and selling past losers, contrarian strategy is based on selling past winners and 
buying past losers. (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993: 65-66.) How can two opposite strategies, 
momentum and contrarian, both generate abnormal returns? Two possible reasons can be 
found. First, previous results might be unrelated to buying past winners or they might 
have been misleading. Second, the inconsistency might be because there is a difference 
between the time periods that are used in research and those that are used in practice. 
Momentum strategies are most frequently analyzed using a 3 to 12 month period. 
However, there is evidence that the price changes that are realized during the holding 
period may not be permanent. Momentum portfolios generate negative abnormal returns 
right around 12 months after the portfolio is formed. The negative abnormal returns then 
continue up to the 31st month. (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993: 66-67.)  Jegadeesh (1990) 
studies a U.S. data from the years 1963–1990. He studies stocks that have either increased 
or decreased during the last month or the last week. He concludes that the loser portfolio 
generates approximately 2 % better returns than the winner portfolio. (Jegadeesh 1990.) 
 
De Bondt and Thaler are among the first researchers who study the contrarian strategy 
and they can be thought to be the ones who have created the basis for the contrarian 
strategy theory. De Bondt and Thaler (1985 & 1987) suggest that stock prices have the 
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tendency to overreact to market information which suggests that the contrarian strategies 
will generate abnormal returns. They also show that contrarian strategy is profitable in a 
longer time period than momentum strategy. They prove that stocks that perform poorly 
during a three to five year formation period will generate positive returns during the 
following three to five year holding period compared to the stocks that perform well 
during the formation period. The main difference between the contrarian strategy and the 
momentum strategy is the holding period. De Bondt and Thaler form two different 
portfolios out of which first consists of recent stock market losers and the other consists 
of recent stock market winners using a data from 1926–1982. They compare the two 
portfolios and their returns on a long time period and come to the conclusion that the 
portfolio that includes the recent losers outperforms the portfolio with the recent winners. 
The so called loser portfolio generates approximately 25 % larger gains on a three year 
time period than the so called winner portfolio. The loser portfolio outperforms the winner 
portfolio also on a five year time period but the gains are not as much significantly higher 
than on the three year time period. 
 
The studies on contrarian strategy – much like the studies on momentum – have been 
mainly done with an U.S. data. But evidence about the functionality of the contrarian 
strategy has been found also using data sets from other parts of the world. Doeswijk 
(1997) uses a Dutch data set and has similar results with other studies on this field. 
Contrarian strategy generates about 8–9 % better results on the Dutch stock market than 
those stocks that are popular among investors. (Doeswijk 1997.) Bildik and Gülay (2002) 
study the contrarian strategy with a Turkish data. Their data shows that abnormal returns 
can be generated with stocks from the Istanbul stock market. During the years of 1991–
2000 the loser portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio with about 15 % per year and 
when comparing the returns of the two portfolios with the ISE-100 index, the winner 
portfolio beats the index by 0.65 % per month while the loser portfolio beats the index by 
1.79 % per month. (Bildik & Gülay 2002.) Similar results have also been found from 
other stock markets, for example the Indian market (Pathak 2011) and the Hong Kong 
market (Ramiah, Cheng, Orriols, Naughton & Hallahan 2011). 
 
It has been widely accepted that the contrarian strategy generates abnormal positive 
returns when a longer time period is used compared to the momentum strategy which uses 
a shorter time period. However, this is not completely true. Also a shorter time period 
while using the contrarian strategy can prove profitable. During the years of 1999–2010 
in the Hong Kong stock market this has been proven to be true. The research is done using 
different holding periods – two, four, six and eight weeks (in this case weeks while 
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normally months). Out of these the best strategies turn out to be the so called 6-2 and 8-
2 strategies (the first number indicates the length of the formation period and the second 
number indicates the length of the holding period). In other words, the stocks that have 
performed poorly (well) during the last six or eight weeks are bought (sold) and then hold 
for two weeks. The shorter time period proves to be more profitable with smaller stocks 
than with larger stocks – which is contradicting with the momentum strategy because it 
is also thought to be more profitable in a shorter time period and with smaller firms. 
(Haomin 2011.) Note, that the time period is significantly shorter than the so called 
normal time period that is used in momentum strategies. 
 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) have a relatively rational view to the profitability 
of the contrarian strategy. They state that a value investor should buy stocks that are not 
popular among other investors. This is based on the fact that when the market encounters 
positive news, these unpopular stocks will react with higher increase in stock prices than 
the stocks that are already popular. They also state that these unpopular stocks can stay 
as unpopular stocks if they cannot change their market situation. To avoid this from 
turning into a trap, they combine the earlier described method with momentum – this had 
never been done before in the value investment scene. During the years of 1973–1993 
this strategy generates positive return of about 23 % per year which again proves that the 
contrarian strategy is a functional investment strategy. (Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny 
1994.)  
 
Contrarian strategy – because it is opposite to the momentum strategy – can be considered 
to be the strongest contradiction even though it has been proven that these two normally 
have differences for example in the time frame in which the strategies generate positive 
returns. Different explanations for the returns either the momentum strategy or the 
contrarian strategy generate, have been formed during the years of research. The reasons 
behind the success of these strategies have emerged for example from behavioral views, 
imperfection of the stock market or stroke of luck. Both of the first two reasons can be 
divided into two groups – the investor-oriented and the market-oriented reasons. These 
try to explain the abnormal positive gains from the traditional finance point of view using 
different theories that explain the anomalies either from the perspective of the investor or 
from the stock market. The reasons include such traditional theories as the Rational 
Choice Theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis, Prospect Theory, and Overreaction and 
Underreaction of the Market. (Nørregård 2008: 8–24.) 
 
30 
 
Finally, data snooping is one of the main sources of critique towards momentum. It is 
mainly due to the fact that most of the early studies in this field use an U.S. data. The U.S. 
data of the previous studies is collected from mainly the same time period and most of 
the stocks included in the studies are the same stocks that previous studies have used. 
This obviously means that it could be concluded that the results are similar if the data is 
similar. This critique has been dismissed and proven to be a false source of critique in the 
more recent studies. The more recent studies have also used data sets that are both global 
and the time period of the studies is more recent than earlier. The more recent studies 
have used data sets for example from Asia and South America. 
 
The previous studies and results are summarized in chronological order in Table 16 which 
can be found in the end of this thesis from Appendix 1. The first part of the table 
represents the literature on momentum and the later part represents the literature on 
contrarian strategy and other critique. Note, that this table represents the main findings of 
the main research papers mentioned in this thesis. The literature about momentum is vast 
and due to that many papers are left unmentioned. 
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4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The research questions of the thesis follow closely the results of the previous studies on 
momentum. As stated earlier, there have been many studies that have proven the existence 
of abnormal positive returns in portfolios that buy the past winners and sell the past losers. 
The results have been similar across the field and in studies that have used basically the 
same data sets as well as in studies that have used totally different data sets. Similar results 
have therefore been found in the U.S. and in the Europe as well as in other countries 
around the world.  Because of the vast amount of evidence for momentum, the main 
assumption of the thesis is that similar results should be found in the used data. However, 
the academic nature of the research does not allow the opposing view to be dismissed. An 
important fact to remember is also the study done by Grobys (2014) which concludes that 
the momentum strategy generates significant negative returns during the recent recession 
periods. Because the time period in this thesis does include a recession period, the 
mentioned conclusion has to be considered a possibility. Another important fact to 
remember is the study done by MSCI BARRA (2010). This study concludes that the 
Australian stock markets are able to generate larger positive momentum gains than other 
Asian countries. On the other hand, the study concludes that the Japanese stock markets 
do not support the momentum strategy theory. Because these countries are included in 
the research, similar results can be expected.  
 
The research questions for the thesis are as follows: 
 
1. Based on historical prices, would the momentum strategy have been profitable 
during 2006–2015? 
2. How did the momentum strategy perform during the recent economic downturns? 
3. How does the momentum strategy perform in different countries? 
4. How does the momentum strategy perform when it consists of different indices? 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1. Data: indices and stocks 
 
The data includes the stocks from 11 indices from different parts of the world. Monthly 
stock and index prices are used. Almost all of the indices can be considered to be from a 
western or at least westernized countries. This makes the indices more comparable with 
each other. The seven European indices included in the thesis are EUROSTOXX 50, CAC 
40 (France), DAX (Germany), FTSE 100 Index (Great-Britain), OMX Helsinki 25 
(Finland) and OMX Stockholm 30 (Sweden). Out of these seven indices EUROSTOXX 
50 is the only one that is not based on a certain country’s stock market – rather it includes 
stocks from various European countries. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. It is described as the leading blue-chip index in the Eurozone. All the other 
European indices are concentrated in a certain country’s stocks indicated in the Chapter 
5.3. When EUROSTOXX 50 is used in the analysis, all other European indices will be 
excluded from the data and vice versa. This is due to their overlapping stock content.  
 
The North-American indices are S&P 100 (USA) and S&P/TSX 60 (Canada). These 
indices include many of the most influential stocks in North-American stock market 
domain. The five Asian indices are MICEX (Russia), Nikkei 225 (Japan) and RTS Index 
(Russia). The Asian indices are the ones that do not represent the western world in the 
most obvious ways but all of the countries are westernized to some extent and have 
western qualities in them. Finally, one Australian index is included, the S&P/ASX 100. 
The Australian index includes the stocks that could be considered to be the most important 
ones in Australia.  
 
The data includes stocks from the above mentioned indices i.e. the stocks that were listed 
on a certain index in the beginning of the year 2016. All the stocks will be estimated as 
individuals. They will be compared with all other stocks in the data set and their results. 
This approach will give an international view to the momentum strategy and it also makes 
it possible to compare stocks from different parts of the world. The second approach uses 
the indices as a whole i.e. the price of the index and studies if there are momentum returns. 
If the first approach proves the existence of momentum gains in the used dataset, the 
second approach can be expected to give similar results as the first approach. All of the 
results will be compared with the risk free rate to see if the portfolios would have 
generated abnormal returns during the time period. 
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Not all of the stocks listed in the above mentioned indices will be included in the thesis 
research. Stocks need to fulfill certain criteria to be included in the thesis. First, stocks 
will be expected to have observations throughout the time period. If a stock has 119 or 
less observations, it will not be included in the research because the time period is 120 
months. Stocks that do not have 120 price observations will be excluded. Second, some 
stocks might be included in two or more indices. Stocks that are listed in several indices 
will be excluded from other indices and only included in the index that is closest to that 
company’s home market/country. However, as the EUROSTOXX 50 includes several 
stocks that overlap with the other European indices, these will be used separately in the 
analysis. This means that, when EUROSTOXX 50 is used (the second part of the 
analysis), the other European indices will not be included and when the other European 
indices are used (the first part of the analysis), EUROSTOXX 50 will not be included in 
that particular analysis. The EUROSTOXX 50 is an important part of the dataset because 
it includes stocks from other European countries that are not included in the study in any 
of the other indices. Third, if an index has two or more stocks that represent the same 
company e.g. A and B stocks, these have been reduced so that only one stock per firm is 
included in the dataset.  
 
 
5.2. Characteristics of the time period 
 
The time period chosen for the thesis spans from January 2006 to December 2015. The 
time period is limited to ten years in order to gain more observations. This is critical 
because only stocks with observations for the entire time period will be included in the 
data. Therefore, the data set includes ten years i.e. 120 monthly observations for each 
stock and index. The time period could be divided roughly into three different subsets 
that have their own time specific characteristics. First subset spans from January 2006 to 
December 2006. This time period precedes the recent financial crisis that has impacted 
the whole world. During this time period the markets were mainly stable and therefore 
momentum gains should have been present. This time period will be called the stable 
market period. This time period is quite short and most of the observations (11 out of 12) 
are lost in the momentum strategy analysis. Therefore, this time period will not be 
analyzed individually. 
 
Second subset spans from 2007 to roughly 2010. This time period includes the recent 
financial crisis period which began in 2007 and ended few years later. There are different 
views of the year the crisis truly ended due to different impacts in different parts of the 
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world. For example, Europe had countries that had to be bailed out of their debts still in 
the year 2012 while Northern America was already doing a lot better but because the view 
of an American investor is adopted the time period of the financial crisis is restricted to 
end at the end of 2010. This time period will be called the financial crisis period. The last 
subset of the time period spans from 2010 to December 2015. This period followed the 
global financial crisis and is characterized by the slow up-turning markets. Some 
countries have recovered better from the crisis than other countries which are still 
suffering from the impacts of the financial crisis. This time period will be called the 
aftermath period. 
 
The time period includes three totally different kinds of subsets and therefore the 
empirical findings can be different among these three subsets. The stable market period 
(even though not empirically examined in this thesis) could be supposed to show that the 
momentum strategy generates abnormal returns. The possible differences of the indices 
and different countries during this time period would indicate that momentum strategy 
would work differently in different settings. The financial crisis period is similar and also 
the same as one of the crisis periods studied by Grobys (2014). Therefore, similar results 
should be found in this empirical research for this particular time period. The aftermath 
period should show that the countries and indices have differences in the possibly 
generated momentum gains and the way the momentum strategy would have worked 
during this time period. This is mainly because the time period holds different 
characteristics for different countries and that is due to the fact that some countries have 
recovered better and faster from the financial crisis than others.   
 
The data will be analyzed in terms of momentum strategy’s performance in three different 
time periods: the whole time period (from December 2006 to December 2015), the 
financial crisis period (from December 2006 to December 2010), and the aftermath period 
(from January 2011 to December 2015). Note that the first 11 observations are lost in the 
analysis and therefore the months from January 2006 to November 2006 will not be 
included in the final results but the information from those months will of course be part 
of the rolling time window and therefore also part of the momentum strategy. 
 
 
5.3. Summary statistics of the data 
 
The following table points out the characteristics of the used dataset. It provides various 
descriptive statistics. As stated in previous chapters, indices originate from different parts 
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of the world including 10 different countries and four different continents. The indices 
represent the most important financial markets and the most important indices of the 
western stock market. Africa, South America, Middle East and the South Eastern Asia 
are not included among the countries and indices from these parts of the world will not 
be researched. Some important stock markets are obviously left out of this thesis, for 
example China and India. Leaving out some of the important stock markets and their 
indices does not mean that there are not momentum gains in those countries.  
 
Most of the previous studies have concentrated on the North American stock markets and 
recently also to the European stock markets but for example the Asian stock markets have 
been left out of many of the previous research. In the case of India – for example – it has 
been shown that momentum investment strategy does exist and it does generate positive 
abnormal returns (Sehgal & Balakrishnan 2008). Also the study done by MSCI BARRA 
(2010) shows evidence for the momentum gains in the Asian stock markets. In this study 
only few of the so called westernized countries of Asia have been included to the research. 
However, this can still give an important and mostly not recognized perspective to the 
momentum investment strategy. 
 
Table 2. points out that the indices included in the thesis differ also in size and in the ratio 
of stocks included in the thesis compared to the number of listed stocks. There are huge 
differences between the indices. While majority of the indices reach 80 % or more in the 
ratio of accepted stocks, the Russian index has a much smaller percentage (28 %) of 
accepted stocks. Table 2. further describes the indices by presenting additional 
information from foundation year to the stock exchange. The information has been 
collected either from the home page of the index or from the home page of the stock 
exchange. The indices are mostly large cap indices and therefore include the biggest 
stocks of each stock market that they represent. Most of the indices are fairly new in terms 
of the foundation year – they have been founded in the late 20th century. The youngest 
index for example is the S&P/ASX 100 index which has been calculated since 2001. 
   
Table 2. Indices. 
Number of included stocks points out the number of stocks that qualify for the analysis from that particular index and the ratio points 
out the percentage of stocks that are represented from that index. 
Indices Country Founded Weighting Method Exchange Type
Number of 
Listed Stocks
Number of 
Included Stocks
Ratio of Accepted 
Stocks
CAC 40 France 1987 Capitalization-weighted Euronext Paris Large Cap 40 38 95.0 %
DAX Germany 1988 Capitalization-weighted Frankfurt Stock Exchange Large Cap 30 29 96.7 %
EUROSTOXX 50 Europe 1998 Free float market capitalization Eurex Mega Cap 50 50 100.0 %
FTSE 100 Index Great Britain 1984 Capitalization-weighted London Stock Exchange Large Cap 100 84 84.0 %
MICEX Russia 1997 Capitalization-weighted Moscow Exchange Large Cap 50 14 28.0 %
Nikkei 225 Japan 1950 Price-weighted Tokyo Stock Exchange - 225 213 94.7 %
OMX Helsinki 25 Finland 1988 Market value weighted Helsinki Stock Exchange Most Traded 25 21 84.0 %
OMX Stockholm 30 Sweden 1986 Capitalization-weighted Stockholm Stock Exchange Most Traded 30 27 90.0 %
ASX 100 Australia 2001 Float-adjusted market capitalization Australian Securities Exchange Large & Mid Cap 100 82 82.0 %
TSX 60 Canada - Float-adjusted market capitalization Toronto Stock Exchange Large Cap 60 55 91.7 %
S&P 100 USA 1976 Float-adjusted market capitalization New York Stock Exchange Large Cap 100 92 92.0 %
Total 810 705
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5.4. Methodology 
 
The main data (index and stock prices) is collected from university's databases, the data 
for the risk free interest rate is collected from Kenneth French's website, the used 
exchange rates for the currency exchange is collected from the database of European 
Central Bank. Each of the index and stock price observations has to be first transferred to 
USD and then modified into monthly returns which are then modified into monthly excess 
returns by subtracting the risk free return rate from the indices' and stocks' monthly 
returns. 
 
Momentum strategies are divided into two periods: the formation period and the holding 
period. During the formation period, the observed stocks are ranked from high to low 
based on their past returns. Those stocks that performed well are expected to perform well 
in the near future and those are the stocks that should be invested in. On the other hand, 
those stocks that performed poorly are expected to perform poorly in the near future. 
These stocks should be either not invested in, sold or taken a short position in order to 
gain from their decreasing price. The holding period is the time period for which the 
momentum portfolio is held. Both of these periods vary in length but the most extensive 
results have been found in the intermediate time period e.g. 3–12 months i.e. the length 
of formation periods and holding periods is usually within that 3–12 months.  
 
This thesis uses four different momentum strategies consisting of 3, 6, 9 and 12 month 
holding periods and each predicting the 2 month ahead returns (3-1-1, 6-1-1, 9-1-1 and 
12-1-1). After calculating the excess returns for each index and stock, (depending on the 
used strategy) a 3/6/9/12 month rolling formation period is used to form the momentum 
portfolios. The data is divided in three different portfolios. The top 30 % of the data will 
be the winner portfolio or the bought portfolio while the low 30 % of the data will be the 
loser portfolio or the sold portfolio. The mid 40 % of the data will be the middle portfolio 
which’ results will not be reported. The portfolios are then used to predict the 2 month 
ahead returns and these portfolio returns are reported in the tables of chapter 6. The 
portfolios are first formed from the stock datasets (first the dataset without EUROSTOXX 
50 and then the dataset with EUROSTOXX 50) and then the portfolios are formed from 
the index datasets (again first without the EUROSTOXX 50 and then with EUROSTOXX 
50).  
 
All of the four strategies are used to analyze the stock datasets and only the 3-1-1 strategy 
is used to analyze the index datasets. This is due to the results not being that significant 
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and the datasets being small samples, therefore the results lack in significance and in 
reliability. The stock datasets are analyzed by using all of the four strategies and also 
using three different time periods. The analysis is done for the whole time period and 
repeated for the crisis and aftermath time periods alone. The results for the buy and sell 
portfolios as well as for the buy-sell portfolio are reported. Then the data is divided into 
groups by index i.e. by country and then again all four strategies are analyzed for each of 
the countries for the whole time period alone because of the significant results for this 
time period in the previous analysis. The results for the buy-sell portfolio are reported.  
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical results of this thesis, in short, further prove the existence of momentum 
returns during the years of 2006–2015. Winner (buy) and loser (sell) portfolios are 
presented alone in the tables and then as a momentum portfolio (buy-sell). First analysis 
does not include market factor and the second analysis does include the market factor. 
The market factor is important because it shows whether or not the market returns impact 
the momentum portfolios’ returns. If this factor is not statistically significant, it means 
that the momentum portfolio’s returns have been determined by momentum and not at all 
by the market returns which obviously is the aim in order to have a successful momentum 
strategy. For this thesis the most important result is the last row of each analysis i.e. the 
result of the buy-sell portfolio with the market factor.  
 
For the stock samples the results suggest that for the whole time period, presented in 
Table 3., the 3-1-1 momentum strategy generated 5.231 % monthly returns which also 
are statistically significant and 6.298 % for the crisis period (Table 4.) and 3.576 % for 
the aftermath period (Table 5.) when using the 3-1-1 strategy. The returns for the crisis 
period are not statistically significant (but they do come close) while for the aftermath 
period the returns are significant. A thing to notice is also the fact that for the whole time 
period the market factor is not significant which means that the momentum strategy is 
very influential. For the sub time periods the market factors are statistically significant. 
For the other stock dataset (with EUROSTOXX 50) the results are mostly not statistically 
significant and for the first strategy 3-1-1 only one of the time periods (full time period) 
provides a significant result of 0.321 % but at the same time also the market factor is 
statistically significant.  
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Full 3-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell -1.054 -0.504 - -
Buy 4.141 1.961 - -
Buy-Sell 5.195 2.275 - -
Sell -1.563 -1.163 0.276 12.457
Buy 3.668 2.452 0.257 10.418
Buy-Sell 5.231 2.281 -0.019 -0.507
Panel B.
Sell -0.008 -0.036 - -
Buy 0.319 1.262 - -
Buy-Sell 0.327 1.497 - -
Sell -0.068 -0.579 0.033 16.789
Buy 0.253 1.772 0.036 15.232
Buy-Sell 0.321 1.467 0.003 0.918
Panel C.
Sell -3.036 -0.101 - -
Buy 2.674 0.098 - -
Buy-Sell 5.710 0.151 - -
Sell -10.254 -0.527 3.919 12.208
Buy -2.622 -0.121 2.875 8.043
Buy-Sell 7.632 0.203 -1.043 -1.684
Panel D.
Sell -3.385 -0.182 - -
Buy -3.575 -0.262 - -
Buy-Sell -0.190 -0.009 - -
Sell -7.588 -0.582 2.283 10.615
Buy -6.060 -0.541 1.349 7.297
Buy-Sell 1.529 0.072 -0.933 -2.662
Table 3. 3-1-1 strategy full time period. 
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Crisis 3-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell -4.475 -1.080 - -
Buy 2.307 0.732 - -
Buy-Sell 6.782 1.576 - -
Sell -3.209 -1.356 0.341 10.025
Buy 3.090 1.307 0.211 6.200
Buy-Sell 6.298 1.518 -0.130 -2.184
Panel B.
Sell -0.344 -0.805 - -
Buy 0.077 0.218 - -
Buy-Sell 0.421 1.222 - -
Sell -0.203 -1.033 0.038 13.430
Buy 0.184 0.914 0.029 9.986
Buy-Sell 0.039 1.152 -0.009 -1.854
Panel C.
Sell -13.260 -0.229 - -
Buy -3.030 -0.069 - -
Buy-Sell 10.229 0.148 - -
Sell 3.907 0.111 4.626 9.120
Buy 6.594 0.184 2.593 5.021
Buy-Sell 2.687 0.040 -2.033 -2.114
Panel D.
Sell -6.500 -0.185 - -
Buy 1.455 0.058 - -
Buy-Sell 7.955 0.190 - -
Sell 3.512 0.154 2.698 8.222
Buy 6.813 0.325 1.444 4.794
Buy-Sell 3.301 0.082 -1.254 -2.159
Table 4. 3-1-1 strategy crisis time period. 
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Aftermath 3-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell 1.739 1.025 - -
Buy 5.639 1.975 - -
Buy-Sell 3.900 1.748 - -
Sell 0.622 0.503 0.175 7.404
Buy 3.576 1.912 0.323 9.031
Buy-Sell 2.954 1.458 0.148 3.819
Panel B.
Sell 0.266 1.313 - -
Buy 0.517 1.442 - -
Buy-Sell 0.250 0.888 - -
Sell 0.112 0.915 0.024 10.262
Buy 0.225 1.219 0.046 12.971
Buy-Sell 0.112 0.458 0.022 4.610
Panel C.
Sell 5.313 0.195 - -
Buy 7.333 0.212 - -
Buy-Sell 2.020 0.051 - -
Sell -13.292 -0.692 2.918 7.936
Buy -13.838 -0.518 3.320 6.485
Buy-Sell -0.546 -0.014 0.402 0.520
Panel D. 
Sell -0.840 -0.047 - -
Buy -7.683 -0.551 - -
Buy-Sell -6.842 -0.334 - -
Sell -11.693 -0.830 1.702 6.309
Buy -15.641 -1.383 1.248 5.765
Buy-Sell -3.948 -0.192 -0.454 -1.151
Table 5. 3-1-1 strategy aftermath time period. 
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For the 6-1-1 strategy the results are somewhat similar (Tables 6.–8.). The momentum 
strategy generates 5.519 % for the whole time period (Table 6.), 7.504 % for the crisis 
time period (Table 7.) and 2.701 % for the aftermath time period (Table 8.). The first two 
out of these are statistically significant and the returns for the aftermath period are not 
significant. Again for the whole time period regression the market factor is not significant 
which highlights the importance of the momentum strategy. In Panel B. no significant 
buy-sell portfolio returns are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Full 6-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell -1.202 -0.571 - -
Buy 4.234 2.086 - -
Buy-Sell 5.436 2.539 - -
Sell -1.735 -1.377 0.290 13.936
Buy 3.784 2.605 0.245 10.204
Buy-Sell 5.519 2.584 -0.045 -1.283
Panel B.
Sell 0.121 0.539 - -
Buy 0.173 0.704 - -
Buy-Sell 0.052 0.255 - -
Sell 0.060 0.519 0.033 17.248
Buy 0.108 0.801 0.035 15.904
Buy-Sell 0.048 0.233 0.002 0.697
Table 6. 6-1-1 strategy full time period. 
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The 9-1-1 strategy generates significant returns of 4.535 % for the whole time period with 
a market factor not being significant (Table 9.), 4.697 % statistically not significant 
Crisis 6-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell -5.121 -1.247 - -
Buy 2.896 0.956 - -
Buy-Sell 8.017 1.986 - -
Sell -3.838 -1.721 0.346 10.788
Buy 3.667 1.645 0.208 6.475
Buy-Sell 7.504 1.956 -0.138 -2.506
Panel B.
Sell -0.283 -0.674 - -
Buy -0.032 -0.089 - -
Buy-Sell 0.252 0.779 - -
Sell -0.145 -0.739 0.037 13.141
Buy 0.080 0.417 0.030 10.896
Buy-Sell 0.226 0.707 -0.007 -1.540
Table 7. 6-1-1 strategy crisis time period. 
Aftermath 6-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell 1.999 1.132 - -
Buy 5.327 1.938 - -
Buy-Sell 3.328 1.614 - -
Sell 0.722 0.625 0.200 9.048
Buy 3.423 1.801 0.299 8.209
Buy-Sell 2.701 1.362 0.098 2.590
Panel B.
Sell 0.452 2.087 - -
Buy 0.341 0.998 - -
Buy-Sell -0.111 -0.424 - -
Sell 0.283 2.272 0.026 11.067
Buy 0.065 0.361 0.043 12.529
Buy-Sell -0.218 -0.912 0.017 3.670
Table 8. 6-1-1 strategy aftermath time period. 
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returns for the crisis period (Table 10.) and 4.074 % statistically significant returns for 
the aftermath period with a market factor not being significant (Table 11.). The returns in 
Panel B. are not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Full 9-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell -0.727 -0.380 - -
Buy 3.829 1.866 - -
Buy-Sell 4.556 2.535 - -
Sell -1.208 -1.042 0.261 13.655
Buy 3.327 2.547 0.272 12.647
Buy-Sell 4.535 2.512 0.011 0.376
Panel B.
Sell 0.047 0.206 - -
Buy 0.256 1.067 - -
Buy-Sell 0.209 1.049 - -
Sell -0.014 -0.114 0.033 16.358
Buy 0.191 1.537 0.035 17.189
Buy-Sell 0.206 1.028 0.002 0.588
Table 9. 9-1-1 strategy full time period. 
Crisis 9-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell -3.456 -0.983 - -
Buy 1.297 0.386 - -
Buy-Sell 4.753 1.407 - -
Sell -2.401 -1.153 0.284 9.496
Buy 2.296 1.136 0.269 9.260
Buy-Sell 4.697 1.375 -0.015 -0.306
Panel B.
Sell -0.256 -0.629 - -
Buy -0.040 -0.106 - -
Buy-Sell 0.216 0.659 - -
Sell -0.126 -0.603 0.035 11.658
Buy 0.082 0.433 0.033 12.060
Buy-Sell 0.208 0.628 -0.002 -0.465
Table 10. 9-1-1 strategy crisis time period. 
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The last strategy 12-1-1 generates returns for the whole time period of 5.131 % which are 
significant while the market factor is not significant (Table 12.), statistically not 
significant returns for the crisis period 5.004 % (Table 13.) and for the aftermath period 
3.832 % which are statistically significant but also the market factor is statistically 
significant. (Table 14.). Panel B. again does not have statistically significant buy-sell 
portfolios. 
 
 
Aftermath 9-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell 1.502 0.775 - -
Buy 5.897 2.339 - -
Buy-Sell 4.395 2.472 - -
Sell 0.075 0.006 0.224 9.458
Buy 4.149 2.383 0.274 8.220
Buy-Sell 4.074 2.297 0.050 1.148
Panel B.
Sell 0.294 1.164 - -
Buy 0.499 1.616 - -
Buy-Sell 0.204 0.825 - -
Sell 0.099 0.668 0.031 10.806
Buy 0.251 1.513 0.039 12.195
Buy-Sell 0.152 0.622 0.008 1.724
Table 11. 9-1-1 strategy aftermath time period. 
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Full 12-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell -1.009 -0.501 - -
Buy 4.124 1.861 - -
Buy-Sell 5.133 2.202 - -
Sell -1.500 -1.165 0.267 12.550
Buy 3.631 2.299 0.268 10.282
Buy-Sell 5.131 2.190 0.001 0.034
Panel B.
Sell -0.030 -0.134 - -
Buy 0.355 1.354 - -
Buy-Sell 0.384 1.621 - -
Sell -0.087 -0.685 0.031 14.854
Buy 0.286 1.925 0.037 15.091
Buy-Sell 0.373 1.583 0.006 1.524
Table 12. 12-1-1 strategy full time period. 
Crisis 12-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell -3.808 -0.937 - -
Buy 1.609 0.489 - -
Buy-Sell 5.418 1.252 - -
Sell -2.572 -1.095 0.333 9.858
Buy 2.432 0.989 0.222 6.267
Buy-Sell 5.004 1.182 -0.112 -1.832
Panel B.
Sell -0.340 -0.775 - -
Buy 0.087 0.245 - -
Buy-Sell 0.457 1.133 - -
Sell -0.197 -0.937 0.039 12.746
Buy 0.192 0.898 0.028 9.216
Buy-Sell 0.389 1.060 -0.010 -1.936
Table 13. 12-1-1 strategy crisis time period. 
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As shown in Tables 5., 8., 11. and 14. the crisis period mainly has no significant 
momentum returns. The only exception is for the 6-1-1 strategy which has a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient for momentum returns. All other coefficients, even 
though not significant, are also positive. For the indices only one strategy is employed, 
the 3-1-1 strategy (Tables 3.–5. Panels C and D). The results show no significance which 
may be due to the small sample size. Therefore the other strategies are not used to analyze 
indices and it may be concluded that investing in indices is – at least according to this 
study – not profitable in terms of momentum strategy. 
 
 Interestingly the market factor (MSCI-RF) does not seem to have statistical significance 
in many of the strategies and time periods. Basically these results indicate that if the 
momentum strategy has significant returns the market factor has no significance and if 
the momentum strategy does not have significant returns the market factor has a 
significant influence on the returns. Also interestingly the returns in Panel B. are for the 
momentum portfolios not significant. Some of the winner portfolio returns are significant 
alone but when combined with the loser portfolio the returns are not significant.  
 
The analysis for different countries (Table 15.) shows the results of all the four 
momentum strategies for the whole time period of 2006–2015. It suggests that only Great-
Britain and the U.S. have statistically significant momentum returns for all of the 
Aftermath 12-1-1 Constant t-statistics MSCI-RF t-statistics
Panel A.
Sell 1.278 0.840 - -
Buy 6.178 2.063 - -
Buy-Sell 4.901 2.068 - -
Sell 0.225 0.213 0.165 8.200
Buy 4.057 2.013 0.333 8.625
Buy-Sell 3.832 1.811 0.168 4.135
Panel B.
Sell 0.224 1.242 - -
Buy 0.573 1.515 - -
Buy-Sell 0.350 1.149 - -
Sell 0.097 0.793 0.020 8.466
Buy 0.257 1.438 0.050 14.530
Buy-Sell 0.160 0.687 0.030 6.708
Table 14. 12-1-1 strategy aftermath time period. 
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strategies and besides these only few other statistically significant returns are reported. 
Almost all of the market factors for these two countries are not significant which further 
improves the meaning of the strategy itself. Out of the other countries in this study only 
Australia and Sweden have one statistically significant momentum strategy. For Japan 
(which has earlier been reported not to have any momentum returns) the results are for 
all strategies statistically not significant and apart from 12-1-1 also negative.  
 
 
Table 15. Momentum strategies for countries. 
3-1-1 MSCI-RF 6-1-1 MSCI-RF 9-1-1 MSCI-RF 12-1-1 MSCI-RF
France -0.192 0.004 -0.369 -0.006 0.018 -0.006 -0.112 0.003
(-0.622) (0.817) (-1.189) (-1.102) (0.064) (-1.183) (-0.317) (0.497)
Germany 0.32 -0.009 0.256 -0.009 0.017 -0.003 0.472 -0.006
(0.666) (-1.192) (0.534) (-1.138) (0.040) (-0.459) (0.934) (-0.696)
Great Britain 22.417 -0.031 25.430 -0.223 18.917 0.052 21.613 0.187
(2.270) (-0.189) (2.683) (-1.428) (2.141) (0.353) (2.175) (1.141)
Russia 2.386 -0.062 -5.298 -0.016 -0.471 -0.019 2.897 -0.058
(0.609) (-0.962) (-1.307) (-0.242) (-0.113) (-0.272) (0.743) (-0.894)
Japan -0.149 0.001 -0.156 0.001 -0.097 0.000 0.010 0.001
(-0.145) (0.350) (-1.588) (0.501) (-1.056) (0.018) (0.091) (0.322)
Finland -0.117 0.000 0.024 -0.001 0.064 -0.001 -0.123 0.003
(-0.676) (0.064) (0.152) (-0.274) (0.417) (-2.358) (-0.727) (1.095)
Sweden 0.085 0.001 0.053 0.000 0.167 -0.003 0.120 0.001
(1.155) (0.834) (0.788) (-0.296) (2.227) (-2.567) (1.601) (0.586)
Australia 0.080 0.000 0.151 -0.001 0.110 -0.002 0.018 0.001
(0.834) (-0.082) (1.635) (-0.488) (1.311) (-1.368) (0.172) (0.417)
Canada -0.056 0.007 -0.122 0.000 -0.019 -0.004 0.037 0.008
(-0.275) (1.966) (-0.655) (-0.160) (-0.118) (-1.719) (0.177) (2.420)
U.S. 0.836 0.010 0.857 0.005 1.024 0.005 0.933 0.016
(1.934) (1.404) (2.110) (0.772) (2.982) (0.956) (2.140) (2.255)
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis examined the possible profitability of momentum investment strategies during 
the years 2006–2015 in an international stock index setting. Even though momentum has 
gained attention and the amount of previous literature is vast, new evidence of its 
persistent existence is still sought from many different perspectives. As beating the 
market returns is and will be the main goal of the investors worldwide, finding not only 
new ways to do that, but also to prove that the so called old ways still work and offer 
abnormal returns, is important. 
 
This paper concentrated on several indices internationally, collecting data from several 
westernized countries worldwide. Four momentum strategies were applied on same 
datasets: 3-1-1, 6-1-1, 9-1-1 and 12-1-1. Each of them using a formation period of a 
certain length (either 3, 6, 9 or 12 months) and each of them predicting the returns of the 
strategy two months ahead i.e. two months after the end of the certain formation period. 
The time period is used as a whole and it is also divided into two smaller sub periods: the 
crisis period (12/2006–12/2010) and the aftermath period (01/2011–12/2015). In light of 
previous studies which have stated that momentum strategy leads to great losses during 
economic downturns, it is important to have a crisis period included in the time period. 
However, the division used in this thesis is not perfect because this thesis’ crisis period 
may be defined somewhat longer than the actual real-life financial crisis. 
 
Based on the historical prices used in this thesis from 2006 to 2015 the momentum 
strategy seems to still be able to generate abnormal returns even when using the entire 
time period to analyze the data even though it includes the financial crisis. The returns 
for the whole time period range from 4.535 % monthly to 5.519 % monthly. These returns 
are somewhat larger than some of the returns in previous studies but on the other hand 
some of the previous studies have reported returns of the same magnitude as those found 
in this study. The crisis period alone generates only one significant result (6-1-1: 7.504 
%) while all other strategies did not generate significant returns for the crisis period which 
is somewhat in line with the conclusion in previous studies that the momentum strategy 
can even generate highly negative returns during economic downturns. However, even 
though the returns of this thesis for the crisis period are not statistically significant, they 
are also not negative which they should be in order to fully support the previous 
conclusion of momentum crashes during financial crises. Also the fact that the only 
significant return of that time period is positive is totally opposite with the previous 
conclusion. This may be due to the fact that the crisis period was actually shorter than the 
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one used in this thesis. A pure analysis of only the crisis period, i.e. the actual length of 
the crisis in real-life, could provide more similar returns with the previous studies. As a 
conclusion this study does provide evidence that suggests that the momentum strategy is 
still profitable on a longer time period even if a crisis is included in the period. The results 
of this thesis suggest that the momentum strategy when constantly used and updated can 
be profitable in a longer investment horizon i.e. when there are resources to keep the 
portfolios up to date and to keep on investing according to the plan. However, the 
previously reported momentum crashes cannot be dismissed and they are so notable that 
their existence is rather the truth than the results of this thesis. 
 
The so called aftermath period shows positive and for two strategies statistically 
significant returns of 3.832 % (9-1-1) and 4.074 % (12-1-1). These are somewhat lower 
than for the whole time period. The lower significance and the lower level of returns may 
be due to the fact that even though momentum returns are persistent and they still exist 
decades after this anomaly has been discovered, the momentum returns have not been as 
large as they used to be. As stated in the literature review (Chapter 3.), momentum 
strategy has lately been more or less in trouble and only barely beaten the market. 
(Hancock 2010.) A significant result of this thesis is also the fact that the market factor 
does not play a significant role in the returns when the portfolio’s momentum returns are 
significant.  
 
This thesis also used a momentum investment strategy that bought the winner portfolio 
consisting of indices and shorted the loser portfolio consisting of other indices. These 
datasets were quite small and did not provide at all statistically significant results. 
Therefore, only 3-1-1 strategy was applied. The results of the 3-1-1 strategy when formed 
from indices indicates that returns could be positive during the whole time period and 
during the crisis period but they could be negative during the aftermath period. This is the 
case for both of the index settings. However, as stated these results are not statistically 
significant while the market factor is significant in both the whole time period and the 
crisis period. This indicates that the returns of these index momentum portfolios are more 
impacted by the market factor i.e. the excess return on top of the MSCI World index than 
momentum itself. It is also worth mentioning that a momentum strategy when it 
comprises of indices might be difficult to keep up to date and to manage mainly due to 
possibly limited resources. 
 
The countries alone seemed not, in general, have significant momentum returns. Only 
Great Britain and the U.S. have statistically significant returns for the whole time period 
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and for all strategies. These returns ranged from 18.917 % (9-1-1) to 25.430 % (6-1-1) 
for Great Britain and from 0.836 % (3-1-1) to 1.024 % (9-1-1) for the U.S. Also the market 
factor is not significant in many of the strategies for these two countries which again 
improves the significance of the momentum returns. Especially the returns for the U.S. 
are of the same magnitude than the returns found in many of the previous studies which, 
as stated earlier, have for a long time mainly used only U.S. data. The returns of larger 
magnitude have often been found from other markets. The reason behind the 
insignificance of the other countries remains a mystery.  
 
However, the returns of the Japanese stocks lacking in significant momentum returns is 
in line with previous literature These Japanese returns range from -0.156 % (6-1-1) to 
0.010 % (12-1-1). Only the 12-1-1 strategy has a positive return (although close to zero) 
and all the other returns for Japanese stocks are negative. This combined with the fact that 
the returns are not statistically significant suggests that the previous studies’ conclusion 
of Japanese stock markets not having momentum is true. On the other hand the Australian 
stocks have earlier provided much larger momentum returns than other countries. In this 
thesis the Australian stocks did not manage to generate abnormal and significant returns 
in other strategies besides the 6-1-1 strategy which generates 0.151 % monthly returns 
(while the market factor was insignificant) and all in all Australian stocks provided 
momentum returns that vary from 0.018 % (12-1-1) to 0.151 % (6-1-1). This does not 
support the previous conclusion of Australian stock markets. According to this study it is 
the Great Britain which generates above average momentum returns and not Australia 
which generates returns that are of the same magnitude with the U.S. and mainly not even 
significant. Besides U.S., Great Britain and Australia, only Swedish stocks provided 
statistically significant returns but only in one of the strategies. The 9-1-1 strategy 
provided 0.167 % monthly but the market factor was also significant.  
 
The momentum strategy is able to produce statistically significant returns when it is used 
for the whole dataset i.e. for all stocks, but when it is used to analyze the countries 
individually, it does not provide that many statistically significant returns. Also the fact 
that if the portfolios are formed from the indices (which include the same stocks with the 
same prices), the momentum strategies’ returns do not exist, is somewhat interesting. 
Similar interesting fact in this thesis is that the dataset with EUROSTOXX 50 is not able 
to produce statistically significant momentum portfolios i.e. buy-sell portfolios. Even 
though some of the individual portfolios are significant the most important combination 
portfolio is not. The EUROSTOXX 50 also includes many of the same stocks than what 
are included in the other indices (e.g. CAC 40) in the first dataset and the second dataset 
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is still not able to generate even close to similar returns than the first dataset. This is 
somewhat puzzling but a possible reason can be found. The returns for the FTSE 100 
index (Great Britain) are much larger than for the other indices. The returns of the first 
dataset (without EUROSTOXX 50) may be driven by the FTSE 100 index’ returns and 
while it is dismissed from the second dataset (with EUROSTOXX 50) and only few of 
its stocks are included i.e. the stocks from FTSE 100 that are also listed to EUROSTOXX 
50, this might cause the low and insignificant momentum returns of the second dataset – 
the same way it could be causing the larger returns of the momentum portfolio in the first 
dataset. 
 
The field of momentum study has been well-researched and the main focus of most recent 
studies in this field has been aiming towards either combining momentum with other 
investment strategies (such as triple-screen strategy (Fuertes et al. 2014.)), or combining 
momentum with totally new aspects (such as managing the risks of momentum strategies 
(Barroso & Santa Clara 2015; Ruotsalainen 2016.)), or studying the effect of deviant 
market circumstances (such as financial crises (Daniel & Moskowitz 2014; Grobys 
2014.)). This thesis represents more classical trend of momentum study, providing views 
to the ultimate question whether or not the momentum strategies are still able to provide 
abnormal returns. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
Table 16. Summary of previous literature on momentum and critique. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Writer Year Time period Data Conclusions
Levy 1967 10/1960 - 10/1965 200 stocks listed on NYSE; 
weekly data.
Buying stocks that are priced 
higher than the average price 
of past 27 weeks generates 
abnormal returns; the relative 
strength trading rule; solely 
based on previous stock 
prices; considered as the first 
momentum researcher.
Jegadeesh & Titman 1993 01/1965 - 12/1989 NYSE & AMEX; stocks 
from the Center for Research 
in Securities Prices (CRSP).
3 - 12 month holding period 
generates positive returns but 
a longer holding period causes 
the returns to vanish; the act 
itself (buying past winners and 
selling past losers) is what 
makes the prices shift from 
their long-term average and 
causes the prices to 
overreact.
Fama & French 2011 11/1989 - 03/2011 23 countries from North 
America, Europe, Asia Pacific 
and also Japan; monthly data.
Strong momentum returns in 
all markets but Japan; value 
premiums are found in every 
market (larger for small 
stocks); absolutely no hint of 
momentum in Japan; winner-
loser spread in momentum 
decreases from small to large.
Rouwenhorst 1998 1980 - 1995 12 European countries; 2,190 
stocks; monthly data.
Motivation for the study arise 
from the claims of data 
snooping (U.S. data was the 
main source of data); 
followed the method of 
Jegadeesh and Titman's 1993 
study; winner portfolio 
outperformed the loser 
portfolio by about 1 % per 
month; momentum is a 
profitable strategy as well in 
Europe.
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Moskowitz & Grinblatt 1999 07/1963 - 07/1995 20 value-weighted industry 
portfolios for every month; 
CRSP and  Compustat; on 
average 230 stocks per 
industry.
Industry momentum is strong 
and persistent; industry 
momentum cannot be 
explained by microstructure 
effects, individual stock 
momentum or the cross-
sectional dispersion in mean 
returns; industry momentum 
contributes to the profitability 
of individual momentum 
strategy; captures these 
individual profits almost 
entirely (except for the 12 
month individual stock 
momentum).
Jegadeesh & Titman 2001 1965 - 1998 All NYSE stocks (some are 
excluded on certain criteria).
Momentum profits still existed 
and were approximately on 
the same 1 % per month one 
year after the formation 
period; their previous results 
were not due to data mining.
George & Hwang 2004 1963 - 2001 All stocks from CRSP; 
collected and constructed as 
Moskowitz & Grinblatt 
(1999).
How close is the current 
stock price to the 52-week 
high; returns are twice as large 
as for the other two strategies 
(individual momentum and 
industry momentum); the 
difference is even larger 
outside January; easiest 
information for the investors 
to collect.
Nørregård 2008 05/1988 - 03/2008 Danish stock market; 79 
stocks.
Momentum strategy would 
generate returns in the Danish 
stock markets that are similar 
with the results of Jegadeesh 
and Titman's 1993 study; 
momentum should not be 
called a market anomaly but a 
dominating market factor 
because of the extensive 
research even thouhg the 
researches have been 
academic in nature.
Jannen & Pham 2009 01/1998 - 05/2007 Large cap U.S. stocks; 1,500 
stocks per year.
Compared three different 
momentum strategies; 1) 
Jegadeesh & Titman's, 2) 
Moskowitz & Grinblatt's 
industry momentum, 3) 
George & Hwang's highest 
pric momentum; industry 
momentum was the most 
profitable, Jegadeesh and 
Titman's strategy came 
second and the least 
profitable was the highest 
price of the 52 week.
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Hancock 2010 1927 - 2009 U.S Approximately 3 % larger 
abnormal returns per year 
than the stock market; 21st 
century has been the weakest 
for momentum strategy; 
momentum strategy generates 
abnormal returns when the 
stock market is at a so called 
normal state but not when it is 
at its bottom or top.
MSCI BARRA 2010 1995 - 2009 Asian stock markets The strategy is profitable but 
huge local differences were 
present; e.g. Australia and 
India had larger momentum 
returns than the whole data 
but Filippines and Thailand 
had negative momentum 
returns (due to Asian market 
crash); Japanese stock 
market showed signs of 
momentum only during years 
of 1996 - 1999 whereas the 
average momentum gains 
were approximately -2.2 % 
per year; 
Novy-Marx 2012 01/1926 - 12/2008 All stocks from CRSP. Intermediate (7 - 12 months) 
time horizon generates better 
returns than short (less than 7 
months) time horizon; similar 
momentum returns can be 
found from other asset classes 
beside stocks; the momentum 
does not accurately describe 
the phenomenon; momentum 
is stronger in large-cap firms 
than previously has been 
acknowledged.
Asness, Moskowitz & 
Pedersen
2013 U.S. & U.K. 01/1972 - 
01/2011; Europe & Japan 
01/1974 - 01/2011
U.S., U.K., continental 
Europe and Japan; average 
number of stocks per area 
724, 147, 290 and 471.
Momentum return premia 
occurs in the eight different 
markets but also in different 
asset classes such as 
currencies, commodities and 
governement bonds.
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Daniel & Moskowitz 2013 07/1927 - 03/2013; divided 
in three samples 07/1927 - 
12/1939, 01/1940 - 12/1999 
and 01/2000 - 03/2013
NYSE, AMEX & 
NASDAQ; monthly and daily 
data; all firms listed on the 
formation date.
The momentum strategy 
comes with a risk of high 
negative returns after major 
market crashes; momentum 
crashes are driven by the 
loser portfolios because they 
start to generate high positive 
returns when the market starts 
to improve after a crash.
Fuertes, Miffre & 
Fernandez-Perez
2014 01/1979 - 08/2011 Commodities (such as 
agriculture, energy, live stock, 
metals); daily data.
Triple-screen strategy 
combines momentum with 
term structure and 
idiosyncratic volatility; this 
combined strategy provided 
11.46 % annualized returns;  
momentum provided 11.42 % 
returns while term structure 
provided 7.02 % and 
idiosyncratic volatility 
provided 3.76 %.
Grobys 2014 07/1998 - 07/2013 Worldwide data (such as 
India, Brazil, U.S. and 
Germany); monthly data.
Momentum strategy generates 
significant negative returns 
during the years of economic 
downturn; the strategy has 
been profitable but during the 
recent recessions it has 
generated negative returns
Asness, Ilmanen, Israel 
& Moskowitz
2015 All samples end 06/2013; 
samples start as follows: 
stocks, industries, developed 
market currencies and indices 
01/1990, commodities 
02/1990, government bonds 
01/1991, interest rates 
04/1990, emerging market 
indices 01/1996 and emerging 
market currencies 04/1997
7 asset classes: stocks, 
industries, indices, 
government bond indices, 
interest rate futures, 
currencies, commodities; 
global data.
Combining momentum 
strategy with other investment 
strategies that have a low 
correlation with each other 
leads most likely to succesfull 
investment portfolio; 
momentum, value, carry and 
defensive are combined; using 
all four seems more profitable 
than using only one or 
alternating between strategies; 
works for other asset classes 
as well.
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Critique
Jensen & Benington 1970 01/1926 - 03/1966 NYSE; 1,952 securities; 
monthly data.
Critiqued Levy's study; 
relative strength trading rule 
did not outperform a simple 
buy and hold strategy when 
they used a different data set 
than Levy had used; 
according to them Levy had 
studied almost 70 different 
trading rules before he came 
up with the relative strength 
trading rule which is obvioulsy 
problematic.
De Bondt & Thaler 1985 & 1987 1926 - 1982 All NYSE stocks; monthly 
data.
Contrarian strategy; argued 
that the stock prices have a 
tendency to overreact to 
market information which 
suggests that contrarian 
strategy will generate 
abnormal returns; longer time 
period is more profitable for 
contrarian strategy than for 
momentum strategy; 3 - 5 
year formation period and 3 - 
5 year holding periods are 
used; loser portfolio 
generated approximately 25 
% larger gains on a three year 
holding period compared to 
the winner portfolio.
Jegadeesh 1990 1963 -1990 U.S. data Studied stocks that had either 
increase or decreased during 
the last month or the last 
week; the loser portfolio 
generated approximately 2 % 
better returns than the winner 
portfolio.
Lakonishok, Shleifer 
& Vishny
1994 04/1963 - 04/1990 AMEX & NYSE A value investor should buy 
unpopular stocks which will 
react to positive market news 
with a higher increase in stock 
prices; contrarian strategy and 
momentum strategy are 
combined; this combination 
provides 23 % positive return 
per year.
Doeswijk 1997 06/1973 - 06/1995 Dutch data; all listed domestic 
stocks.
Contrarian strategy generated 
about 8 - 9 % better returns 
than popular stocks
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Bildik & Gulay 2002 1991 - 2000 Turkish data The loser portfolio 
outperformed the winner 
portfolio with about 15 % per 
year; the winner portofolio 
beat the ISE-100 index by 
0.65 % while the loser 
portfolio beat it by 1.79 %. 
Haomin 2011 1999 - 2010 Hong Kong stock market Also a shorter time period can 
be profitable for the 
contrarian strategy; the most 
profitable strategies consisted 
of 6 week formation period 
and 2 week holding period or 
8 week formation period and 
2 week holding period; 
smaller stocks seem to be 
more profitable than large 
stocks.
Pathak 2011 03/1993 - 03/2007 Indian data; all BSE listed 
stocks.
Buying unpopular stocks is 
profitable; value strategy 
earns good returns and 
outperforms the glamour 
stocks.
Ramiah, Cheng, 
Orriols, Naughton & 
Hallahan
2011 03/2001 - 03/2006 Hong Kong stock market; 
1,399 stocks (761 stocks 
listed only on Hong Kong 
stock exchange + 638 dually-
listed stocks; monthly data.
Substantial conrarian profits; 
on average contrarian strategy 
earns up to 6.08% per month; 
returns for dually-listed stocks 
were systematically higher 
than for those listed only on 
Hong Kong stock exchange.
